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Post-conﬂict states present a challenging yet under-theorized
context for the implementation of gender mainstreaming, a
pro-active and holistic approach to promoting gender equality
in policy and law. In particular, insuﬃcient scholarly attention
has been paid to how mainstreaming interacts with transi-
tional justice during state reconstruction. In social theory-
terms the post-conﬂict phase can be viewed as a ‘‘policy win-
dow”—or what neo-institutionalism refers to as a ‘‘critical
juncture”. It is the point when the restoration of the rule of
law (‘‘transitional justice”) presents an opportunity to redraft
structures and processes of governance to embed gender
equality in ways consistent with the mainstreaming ethos.
Yet for this to be done eﬀectively ﬁrst requires understanding
of the speciﬁc issues related to the implementation of the Par-
ticipative Democratic Model of gender mainstreaming (PDM)
in war-aﬀected states.
Originally developed in work by Nott (2000), the PDM
requires governments to engage with civil society and promote
gender equality in all aspects of policymaking (see also Barnett
Donaghy, 2003; Sen, 2000). It is an imperative originating
from the UN Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action
(BDPfA), a landmark conference on women’s rights held in
1995 (Bunch & Fried, 1996). 1 The Beijing Declaration also
requires civil society organisations’ (CSO) perspectives to be
taken into account in the UN’s monitoring of the 180
signatory-states’ progress in realizing the BDPfA’s goals. Thus
this study’s original contribution is to use the rich dataset
comprising CSO reports to the UN in order to advance under-
standing of the challenges of the PDM in post-conﬂict coun-
tries.
The ﬁndings show that in war-aﬀected states the PDM has
speciﬁc data, transitional justice, and governance requirements
as policy actors press for heightened attention to issues such as
the eﬀects on women of war-induced poverty and human
rights violations—as well as the need to promote women’s280empowerment in state reconstruction and peace-building. In
addition, the ensuing discussion suggests that, in the twelve
post-conﬂict states studied, the legacy of war impedes the
PDM by disrupting and weakening civil society networks
and engagement, thereby adding to a disjuncture between
the discourse of CSOs and governing policy elites. In turn,
the present empirical analysis forms the basis for a Transfor-
mative Model of Participative Mainstreaming in Post-
Conﬂict States. It is a heuristic that draws on the transitional
justice literature in order to build a conceptual analytical
framework that captures the challenges of mainstreaming in
post conﬂict environments. Rather than being a universal,
unvarying schema, the Model is adaptive to the speciﬁcities
of individual countries. Its purpose is to inform future practice
and pave the way for further empirical investigation via single-
country or comparative regional studies.
The overall focus of this study is apposite because, since its
launch in 1995, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for
Action has been applied to a global context in which there
has been over 100 episodes of major armed conﬂict
(Derouen, Heo, & Heo, 2007). 2 However, notwithstanding
the ubiquity of war and the PDM’s status as the leading inter-
national approach to gender equality, there has been a dearth
of cross-national analysis of its implementation in post- con-
ﬂict societies. Ni Aolain, Haynes, and Cahn’s seminal work
(2011, p. 11) concurs, noting: ‘‘further concrete research on
the successes and shortcomings of gender mainstreaming in
development and post-conﬂict settings is needed before a more
thorough evaluation can emerge”. Moreover, as Omona and
Aduo (2013, p. 119) cogently note, ‘‘stakeholders need to eﬀec-
tively consider analysis of need by gender in their programmesaccepted: January 10, 2016.
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is to be realised”. Accordingly, 20-years on from Beijing Dec-
laration, this paper addresses these lacunae. As noted, atten-
tion to civil society views is appropriate because the
Participative Democratic Model of mainstreaming is predi-
cated on Article 20 of the BDPfA. This asserts ‘‘civil society
cooperation with Governments [is] important to the eﬀective
implementation and follow-up of the Platform for Action”.
Governments should secure, ‘‘the participation and contribu-
tion of all actors of civil society, particularly women’s groups
and networks and other non-governmental organizations and
community-based organizations, with full respect for their
autonomy” (UN, 1995). Thus, far from being a top-down,
imposed political ‘‘project”—progress depends upon eﬀective
engagement and co-working between the state and civil soci-
ety.
The current use of critical discourse analysis is underpinned
by diverse strands of social theory including the interpretive
school of policy analysis (Yanow, 1999) and the literature
on social constructivism (Kukla, 2000). Both place emphasis
on language—speciﬁcally, policy discourse—in order to reveal
policy actors’ ‘‘cognitive maps”. In other words, their beliefs,
values, interpretations, and knowledge relevant to addressing
a given policy issue (Eden & Ackermann, 2004). The analysis
explores ‘‘issue salience” or the level of attention to areas or
topics of concern. Reference to the literature on qualitative
analysis using framing shows how this matters. As Snow
et al. (1986, p. 464) note it ‘‘render[s] events or occurrences
meaningful. . . [it] function[s] to organize experience and guide
action, whether individual or collective” (emphasis added).
Thus, the level of attention to a frame—or ‘‘issue areas of con-
cern”—is central to understanding policy intervention. Partic-
ularly, as in the present case, it tells us whether
implementation is attuned to the needs of a given social and
political context—such as societies adapting from earlier epi-
sodes of conﬂict. ‘‘Issue-salience” here is a technique borrowed
from electoral studies (cf. Volkens, 2001); it focuses on the
level of attention to a given topic among competing issues
and agendas in political discourse. The underlying rationale
is grounded in the literature of political agenda setting (Cf.
Cobb & Ross, 1997) and states that the greater the focus
and prioritization of an issue, probabilistically, the greater
likelihood it will ultimately translate into eﬀective policy out-
comes. Overall, framing and issue-salience come together in
the underlying logic that policy actors with shared understand-
ings, priorities for action are better placed to achieve strategic
policy goals.
On deﬁnitional matters, for the present purposes ‘‘armed
conﬂict” signiﬁes ‘‘a contested incompatibility which concerns
government and/or territory where the use of armed force
between two parties, of which at least one is the government
of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths”
(UCDP, 2014, p. 7). Whereas ‘‘civil society” refers to associa-
tional activities involving the family, non-governmental orga-
nizations, pressure groups, charities, community groups,
social movements and campaigning organizations (Cohen &
Arato, 1994; Keane, 1988).
The key data sources in this study are: 1. A stratiﬁed ran-
dom sample of 120 reports submitted to the United Nations
by women’s CSO operating in post-conﬂict countries 2005–
15 3; and 2. national Beijing +20 reports (circa 2014–15) from
a dozen post-conﬂict UN member states, along with a second
‘‘control group” from 12 non-conﬂict countries. These data-
sets allow an assessment of the issues, progress, and challenges
related to the implementation of mainstreaming as required by
the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.The remainder of the paper is structured thus: following an
overview of the literature on mainstreaming, civil society and
conﬂict, the methodology is summarized. Next, analysis of
state discourse is presented. It is followed by an exploration
of civil society organisations’ discourse on the implementation
of mainstreaming in war-aﬀected states. The empirical data
are then used to build theory and a Transformative Model
of Participative Mainstreaming in post-conﬂict states is out-
lined. The concluding section reﬂects on the way that PDM
is aﬀected by post-conﬂict contexts and the implications for
future policy and practice.2. PARTICIPATIVE DEMOCRATIC MAINSTREAM-
ING, CIVIL SOCIETY AND CONFLICT
The international spread of gender mainstreaming over the
past quarter century has been promoted by the United
Nations. Its uptake also owes much to its holistic and pro-
active nature (notably, through the application of key princi-
ples, tools, and techniques to all stages of the policy process,
see Ghodsee, Stan, & Weiner, 2010)—as well as its democratic
credentials (Luciak, 2001). A full discussion of its development
is beyond the present purposes (for a discussion see for exam-
ple Rees, 2005). The UN (2002, p. v) deﬁnes it as follows:
the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any
planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all
areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as
men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design,
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and pro-
grammes in all political, economic, and societal spheres so that women
and men beneﬁt equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ulti-
mate goal is to achieve gender equality.
Despite the rapid spread of mainstreaming this has not been
a uniform process. Thus, Hafner-Burton and Pollack (2002, p.
339, emphasis added) allude to the varied impact that main-
streaming has had in a global context: ‘‘we suggest, however,
that the rhetorical acceptance of mainstreaming by various
international organizations obscures considerable diversity in
both the timing and the nature of mainstreaming processes
within and among organizations. This variation, we argue,
can be explained in terms of the categories of political oppor-
tunity, mobilizing structures and strategic framing put forward
by social movement theorists”. Accordingly, this study
responds to the latter call and examines these aspects in
post-conﬂict countries.
As a burgeoning literature reveals, gender mainstreaming is
more successful if it is informed and advanced by women’s
movements as well as wider civil society engagement (see for
example Carney, 2002; Chaney, 2013, 2016; Madsen, 2012;
True, 2003). In contrast to technical and bureaucratic
approaches, this has been dubbed the ‘‘participative demo-
cratic model” of mainstreaming, for it places emphasis on
involving those targeted by mainstreaming initiatives in both
the design and delivery of policy (Barnett Donaghy, 2003;
Nott, 2000). As noted, it has wide international ‘‘reach”. It
has received particular attention in the UK, notably in the
wake of devolution in 1998–99 (Beveridge, Nott, & Stephen,
2000; Chaney, 2012). Other prominent examples include Ire-
land, the United States, and Italy—where it has been used
by governments and CSOs alike in order to boost the uptake
and ‘‘ownership” of attempts to embed gender equality in pol-
icy making (see Mackay & Bilton, 2003, p. 6).
As Debusscher and Van der Vleuten (2012, p. 326) observe,
participative ‘‘mainstreaming is constructed, articulated, and
transformed through discourse. Policy-makers carry the
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society and individual activists promoting [. . .] equality”. In
turn, ‘‘participation” and ‘‘engagement” here can be deﬁned
as the full range of formal and informal means employed by
individuals and groups to inﬂuence the aims, scope, design,
and implementation of public policy (Hogwood & Gunn,
1984). These include networking, protest, boycott, lobbying,
and campaigning. Notwithstanding the centrality of civil soci-
ety to the PDM a recent survey of the strategic plans of lead-
ing international development organizations found that under
a half acknowledged capacity building and civil society
engagement as a prerequisite for successful mainstreaming
outcomes (Moser & Moser, 2005, p. 14; see also Tiessen, 2007).
As noted, the term civil society refers to the realm of dialog
and human relations that is connected to, but distinct from,
the state, markets, and personal or familial sphere (Cohen &
Arato, 1994; Keane, 1988). It is a social arena that is of pivotal
signiﬁcance to understanding contemporary gender relations
because of its potential to challenge the largely male-
dominated character of state institutions, act as a source of
pluralism and solidarity around norms of equality
(Alexander, 1998), and be a locus for rights and recognition
(Fraser, 1998; Honneth, 2005). It thus constitutes a key social
and political nexus with the state where CSOs may advocate,
politicize, and provide services for women through representa-
tion and gendered claims-making cognizant of a history of
marginalization and oppression (Pascall & Lewis, 2004).
From an international perspective there have been over 300
episodes 4 of major armed conﬂict since 1945 (Derouen et al.,
2007). 5 In consequence, post-conﬂict countries are subject to a
burgeoning literature (for a discussion see Downs & Stedman,
2002). Here they are deﬁned here by adopting Brown, Langer,
and Stewart’s deﬁnition (2011, p. 4):
Rather than pick one or other condition to deﬁne the beginning and end of
``post-conﬂict,” a more productive approach to conceptualizing the post-
conﬂict scenario is to see it not as a period bounded by a single speciﬁc
event, but as a process that involves the achievement of a range of peace
milestones. Taking a process-oriented approach means that ``post-
conﬂict” countries should be seen as lying along a transition continuum
(in which they sometimes move backward), rather than placed in more or
less arbitrary boxes, of being ``in conﬂict” or ``at peace.”
Examples of the ‘‘milestones” in the post-conﬂict transition
alluded to include: cessation of hostilities and violence; signing
of political/peace agreements; demobilization, disarmament
and reintegration; refugee repatriation; establishing a func-
tioning state; achieving reconciliation and societal integration;
and, economic recovery.
Recent work has called for increased attention to gender
equality in the aftermath of war. For example, Mckay (2000,
p. 561) has questioned ‘‘whether justice can be achieved when
judicial and reconciliation processes enable and give power to
a select group”? In response, she proposed analytical emphasis
on gender justice or ‘‘legal processes which are equitable, not
privileged by and for men, and which distinguish the nefarious
forms of injustice women experience during and after armed
conﬂict”. Notwithstanding this call, the literatures of main-
streaming, civil society and conﬂict have largely traveled on
parallel tracks. Noted exceptions include Nı´ Aola´in et al.’s
(2011, pp. 231–232) work. Here the conclusion was that:
Governance programs, even those now required to ``mainstream gender”
trend toward securing formal political rights within ofﬁcial political struc-
tures and institutions. Existing programs in general try to slot women into
new or reformed institutions and secure women's de jure political and civil
rights, reﬂecting our general critique of gender mainstreaming as being
grafted on, rather than initiated from an organic assessment of what women
want and need.Against this backdrop it is germane to underline why gender
mainstreaming is so important in post-conﬂict contexts. It is
because state rebuilding in war-aﬀected states constitutes a
unique opportunity to embed gender equality when the struc-
tures, institutions and processes of governance are being re-
modeled. This resonates with no less than three strands of
social theory. It is an example of Kingdon’s theoretical notion
of a ‘‘policy window” (Kingdon, 1995). Furthermore, it is
what neo-institutionalist theory dubs a ‘‘critical juncture”
(Collier & Collier, 1991). Alternatively, as noted, expressed
in terms of social movements theory (McAdam, McCarthy,
& Zald, 1996), the post-conﬂict state possesses singular ‘‘polit-
ical opportunity structures”—as resources, mobilization, and
framings seek to rebuild eﬀective governance. In order to see
whether theory is borne out in practice the following method-
ology is employed.3. METHODOLOGY
This study combines qualitative and quantitative critical dis-
course analysis of policy ‘‘framing”. As Creed, Langstraat,
and Scully (2002, p. 37) explain; frames can be viewed as ‘‘a
necessary property of a text—where text is broadly conceived
to include discourses, patterned behavior, and systems of
meaning, policy, logics, constitutional principles, and deep
cultural narratives”. The aspect examined here is the level of
attention to diﬀerent ‘‘issue areas”, in other words the way
that states and CSOs frame their discourse in the UN reports
in terms of diﬀerent policy topics. To operationalize this a
deductive coding schemata (Boyatzis, 1998; Joﬀe & Yardley,
2003) was used to identify key topics—or issue areas—in state
and CSO discourse. For example, equality, human rights, rec-
onciliation, economic inequality, education, and gender-based
violence (see Figure 1—for a full listing). In addition, a num-
ber of tropes are associated with the issue-areas in the dis-
course. These are themes associated with the issue-areas (see
Fischer & Forester, 1993). For example, under the ‘‘rights”
issue-area a reoccurring trope was the need to embed rights
in new governance/constitutional frameworks. In the case of
the gender-based violence issue-area a common trope was ret-
rospective pursuit of rights violations that occurred during
conﬂict.
The current methodology involves measuring ‘‘issue-sal
ience”—or the level of attention to a given topic among com-
peting issues and agendas in the discourse. It is determined by
content analysis (Krippendorﬀ & Bock, 2008)—or the fre-
quency of key words, ideas or meanings in policy documents.
This was done by adapting a procedure derived from electoral
studies, whereby texts are divided into ‘‘quasi-sentences” (or,
‘‘an argument which is the verbal expression of one political
idea or issue,” Volkens, 2001, p. 96). Dividing sentences in this
manner controls for long sentences that contain multiple pol-
icy ideas. To operationalize the methodology electronic ver-
sions of the policy documents were analyzed using
appropriate software. Oﬃcial UN translations were used when
the original document was in a language other than English.
A purposive sample of twelve states drawn from Africa,
Asia, and Europe was selected. In each there had been signif-
icant conﬂict in the past two decades (see Table 1). Three con-
tinents formed the basis of the sample in order to present
manageable dataset while at the same time oﬀering an interna-
tional perspective and a range of development contexts. The
research design was constructed in order to identify particular
issues in the implementation of mainstreaming related to war-
aﬀected countries. The ﬁrst phase in this process was aggregate
Table 1. The post-conﬂict states: a summary
State Principal years of conﬂict Overview
Afghanistan 1996–2014 Afghan Civil Wars 1996–2001; followed by US wars in Afghanistan oﬃcially ended on December 28,
2014. US-led NATO troops remain training & advising Afghan govt. forces. 90,000+ direct war-
related deaths (Cramer & Goodhand, 2012; Zenkevicius, 2007)
Bosnia 1992–95 Bosnian War—an international armed conﬂict in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992–95. Part of the break-
up of Yugoslavia. 100,000 people were killed (Jeﬀery, 2006)
Croatia 1991–95 Croatian War of Independence—conﬂict between Croat forces loyal to Govt. Croatia—which had
declared independence from Republic of Yugoslavia —and the Serb-controlled Yugoslav Army/local
Serb forces. 20,000 fatalities (Clark, 2013)
Ethiopia 1961–91, 1998–2000 1961–1991, Eritrea fought war of independence against Ethiopia. Ethiopian Civil War began
September 1974. Eritrean–Ethiopian War 1998–2000 between. Estimates 100–300,000 casualties
(Clapham, 2009)
Georgia 2008 Russo-Georgian War—conﬂict between Georgia, Russia, and the Russian-backed self-proclaimed
republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Est. 1000 causalities (Lynch, 2002)
Liberia 1989–96, 1999–2003 First Liberian Civil War—1989–96 Samuel Doe led coup d’e´tat overthrew the elected government in
1980 (100,000–220,000 killed). Second Liberian Civil War—1999–2003 Liberian dissidents
‘‘Organization of Displaced Liberians” invaded from Guinea (150,000–300,000 killed) (Reisinger,
2009)
Namibia 1966–90 Namibian War of Independence—nationalist SW Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) and allies
fought against the apartheid government of South Africa/ intertwined with the S. African Border War
(11,500 casualties) (Kabia, 2010)
Nepal 1996–2006 Armed conﬂict between government forces and Maoist rebels. 18,000 killed (Siitonen, 2011)
Sierra Leone 1991–2002 Began when Revolutionary United Front & National Patriotic Front of Liberia attempted to
overthrow govt. of Joseph Momoh (over 50,000 dead) (Kabia, 2010)
Sudan 1955–72, 1983–2005, 2013–15 Complex civil conﬂict between the central Sudanese government and the Sudan People’s Liberation
Army combined with factionalism and inter-ethnic tensions. February 2015, agreement signed in
Addis Ababa, for future transitional government of national unity (Baker & Scheye, 2009)
Rwanda 1990–94 Conﬂict between the government of President Juve´nal Habyarimana and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic
Front—sparked genocidal mass ethnic slaughter of Tutsi and Hutus (estimated 500,000–1,000,000
killed) (Uvin, 2001)
Timor 1999–2000 1999 civil conﬂict after majority of eligible voters in the population of East Timor chose independence
from Indonesia. 2006 East Timorese crisis—a conﬂict between sections of the military, expanded to a
coup attempt and general violence throughout country (1,400 died) (Huang & Harris, 2006)
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Figure 1. State framing on the implementation of the BDPfA: post- and non-conﬂict states compared (N = 16,815).
CIVIL SOCIETY AND GENDER MAINSTREAMING 283
284 WORLD DEVELOPMENTcomparison of the framing in post conﬂict and non-conﬂict
countries. 6 Subsequently, the issues identiﬁed were further
explored by analyzing civil society organisations’ discourse
in a stratiﬁed random sample of 120 CSO annual reports sub-
mitted to the UN Commission on the Status of Women
follow-up to the Fourth World Conference on Women. 7
Twelve reports were selected from each of the post-conﬂict
countries 2005–15. To increase reliability both phases of cod-
ing (i.e., frames and policy areas) were repeated by a research
assistant. This revealed a limited number of discrepancies. In
total seven incidences were identiﬁed (under 1%) these were
resolved through discussion between coders. Attention now
turns to the study ﬁndings—ﬁrst in relation to state discourse
on mainstreaming in post-conﬂict societies, followed by ﬁnd-
ings from civil society discourse.4. RESEARCH FINDINGS
(a) State discourse on the implementation of the Beijing
declaration and platform for action
Comparative analysis of state discourse on gender main-
streaming in the 12 post-conﬂict states’ and a ‘‘control” group
of twelve non-conﬂict states shows statistically signiﬁcant dif-
ferences framing (p = <0.001) (Figure 1). 8 This matters
because, as the following discussion outlines, it reveals the
way post-conﬂict contexts shape the implementation of
PDM—and, compared to other states, it points to the speciﬁc
requirements or demands of war-aﬀected societies.
Accordingly, in the post-conﬂict states the ﬁrst-ranked
frame in the state discourse was ‘‘rights/ justice” (15.9% of
all quasi-sentences); whereas in the ‘‘control” set of non-
conﬂict states this was fourth-ranked (8.7%) (p = <0.001). 9
In the former case the discourse was dominated by the legacy
of conﬂict. In part, the prominence of the frame reﬂects the
ﬁndings of earlier work (Adelman & Peterman, 2014) under-
lining how the absence of rights in post-conﬂict contexts can
perpetuate the threat of civil violence. Allied to this the dis-
course centered on transitional justice matters, principally
rebuilding institutions to uphold rights. For example, the need
for ‘‘the establishment of many of the structures, mechanisms,
and oﬃcial supporting institutions for the advancement of
women. . . and mechanisms for deployment of international
conventions, and women’s rights, human rights, the dissemi-
nation of legal culture” (Sudan, 2015, p. 33). A further aspect
was embedding rights in new constitutional frameworks. For
example, ‘‘legal reforms have been adopted by the government
on the basis of the foundation document—the constitution
which guarantees fundamental human rights and principles
of equality and non-discrimination” (Ethiopia, 2015, p. 17).
Another key trope was the pursuit of rights violations during
conﬂict. For example, ‘‘the Afghanistan Independent Human
Rights Commission. . . in the event that government authori-
ties do not pursue human rights violation cases or violation
occurs in relation to this, individuals can visit the Human
Rights Commission and request it to pursue the case” (Afgha-
nistan, 2015, p. 12).
The present ﬁndings showing the emphasis on rights in post
conﬂict states’ discourse aligns with recent work (Bell &
O’Rourke, 2007, p. 43) calling for a (re-)appraisal of the
‘‘how transitional justice debates help or hinder broader pro-
jects of securing material gains for women through transi-
tion”. Speciﬁcally, rather than solely focusing on judicial
and non-judicial measures implemented to redress the legacies
of human rights abuses, it is argued that ‘‘transitional justice”may usefully be seen as a broader concept that resonates with
attempts to apply the Participative Democratic Model of
mainstreaming in war-aﬀected states. This viewpoint encom-
passes ‘‘the normative proposition that various legal responses
should be evaluated on: 1. the basis of their prospects for
democracy” (Teitel, 2000, p. 7; 2003) and; 2. They should be
informed by the idea of ‘‘gender justice”—or, ‘‘legal processes
that are equitable, not privileged by and for men, and which
acknowledge ways in which women uniquely experience
harm” (Mckay, 2000, p. 24). Accordingly, as the following dis-
cussion of study ﬁndings from post-conﬂict societies suggests,
‘‘transitional justice” needs to be seen in the context of legal
processes and women’s ‘‘voice” in shaping policy and law-
making through their societal position and the extent to which
they are included in the representative structures of the state
(cf. Menkel-Meadow, 1988; Tomlinson, 2011). In turn, these
empirical data inform the theoretical framework proposed at
the end of the paper.
Generic references to ‘‘gender equality” constituted the
second-ranked frame in post-conﬂict states, constituting 14%
of quasi-sentences; whereas it was ﬁrst-ranked in non-
conﬂict states (27.1%, p = <0.001). 10 For example, the eﬀects
of ‘‘armed conﬂict. . . [means Nepal] continues to suﬀer from
political transition and instability. Although the political
chaos has hampered the promotion of gender equality. . . it is
recognized that disparity still remains and much eﬀort is
needed to achieve gender equality” (Nepal, 2015, p. 5). This
resonates with earlier work by Moser (2005, p. 588) who notes
that, ‘‘in the [global] north equality may be more of a priority
than empowerment; gender mainstreaming may be seen more
as the responsibility of government than other institutions
(such as donors or civil society)”.
The third-ranked frame in post-conﬂict states was gender-
based violence (GBV) (12.3% of quasi-sentences), in non-
conﬂict states it was second-ranked (19.3%), (p = <0.001). 11
In the former case it is principally concerned with the interplay
of war and GBV. The dominant theme was securing justice for
victims of GBV during conﬂict. Examples include: ‘‘in Afgha-
nistan, women. . . face an even more complicated matter,
namely the diverse forms of violence rooted in war and insecu-
rity. Other factors go hand in hand and create this dire phe-
nomenon, the most signiﬁcant of which are: the lack of law
enforcement” (Afghanistan, 2015, p. 5); and: ‘‘the Program
for Victims of War-related Rape, Sexual Abuse and Torture
in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2013–16 was developed with the
aim of ensuring full protection and support to victims of
war-related rape, sexual abuse, and torture, and their families,
through the improvement of their access to justice, better reha-
bilitation, re-socialization, and compensation programs, with
active participation of all stakeholders” (Bosnia Herzegovina,
2015, p. 27). The discourse also alludes to the lingering cul-
tural and attitudinal eﬀects of war: ‘‘unfavourable social
norms which take violence as part of culture and norm of soci-
ety hinder the adequate implementation of the [GBV] laws”
(Ethiopia, 2015, p. 26).
The fourth-ranked frame in post-conﬂict states is ‘‘educa-
tion” (11.4% of quasi-sentences), whereas in non-conﬂict
states it was sixth-ranked, 7.1%) (p = <0.001). 12 Not only
are there signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the attention to this frame,
there are also marked contrasts in its use. In the former case
there is repeated emphasis on the gendered impact of war.
For example, ‘‘unfortunately, one of the areas that has been
most aﬀected by war in Afghanistan is the education sec-
tor. . .The women have suﬀered the most and that is why edu-
cation authorities pay more attention to this
matter. . .Therefore, women’s promotion in education lays
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political, social and nurturing development” (Afghanistan,
2015, p. 13). Textual analysis of the education frame reveals
a hybridization between mainstreaming and positive action.
It is illustrated by the case of Liberia: ‘‘The Education Reform
Act of 2011. . . continues to further build on the Girls” Educa-
tion Policy of 2006 and addresses. . .Recruitment and training
of more female teachers; providing counseling in schools for
girls. . .Oﬀering life skills in school to raise the self-esteem of
girls so they can say no to sexual abuse; and increasing the
availability of school scholarships for girls” (Liberia, 2015,
p. 5).
In post-conﬂict states the ﬁfth-ranked frame was gender and
economic inequality/poverty (10.1% of quasi-sentences),
whereas it was third-ranked (9.2% in non-conﬂict states).
Again, there is a qualitative diﬀerence in the frame’s usage.
In post-conﬂict environments the key issue is the gendered
impact of war on poverty. For example, ‘‘emerging issues
beyond the year 2015 . . .women in conﬂict areas and refugee
camps: [war-related factors] threaten women in development
as the most vulnerable as they face displacement, homeless-
ness, poverty, and the burden of household. . .” (Sudan,
2015, p. 48). Further to earlier work underlining the scale of
the challenges facing post conﬂict states (Hill, 2001), the pre-
sent ﬁndings show how gender and poverty are articulated
in the context of nation-building. For example, ‘‘women and
poverty. . . since independence in 2002, Timor-Leste’s social
and economic policies have focused on alleviating poverty to
address the immediate needs of our people, consolidating secu-
rity and stability, and providing a foundation for nationhood
through building institutions of State” (Timor-Leste, 2015, p.
15).
Women’s participation in decision-making was the sixth-
ranked frame in post-conﬂict states (8.7% of quasi-
sentences); it was ﬁfth in non-conﬂict states (7.3%,
p = <0.001). 13 The low ranking of this frame is striking given
the centrality of state-civil society engagement to participative
mainstreaming. It is all the more surprising given govern-
ments’ repeated acknowledgment of how war has often set
back women’s participation in representative structures. Yet
it is also the case that this may reﬂect the fact that these issues
have already been addressed to a greater extent that other
issues, since post-conﬂict countries are more likely to adopt
quotas for women’s representation than non-post-conﬂict
states. Examples of the discourse include: ‘‘greatest challenges
in achieving gender equality. . . it will be necessary to increase
participation of women in decision-making processes in polit-
ical, economic, and ﬁnancial areas, as well as in all other areas
of life” (Bosnia–Herzegovina, 2015, p. 7); and ‘‘A strategic
plan covering the period 2011–30 was approved by the Coun-
cil of Ministers in 2012. . .gender equity in participation is one
of the priorities” (Timor-Leste, 2015, p. 38).
The post-conﬂict discourse under the ‘‘participation” frame
places particular emphasis on the transition to democracy.
Thus, for example, the Rwandan discourse alludes to, ‘‘eﬀec-
tive civil society engagement is a key feature of good gover-
nance as an important framework for citizens to voice their
needs. [This is] Key to making accountability systems work”
(Rwanda, 2015, p. 51). A further noteworthy aspect is how
civil society participation is largely unproblematized in state
discourse. This aligns with research by Pouligny (2005, p.
495) that questions the way that oﬃcial discourse often
homogenizes ‘‘civil society” in post-conﬂict peacebuilding
and ‘‘tend[s] to forget the large diversity of local civil societies,
creating many counter-eﬀects in the way international pro-
grammes purport to support or empower local peopleand. . .may contribute to post-conﬂict peacebuilding” (see also
Cornwall, 2003, p. 1325).
Overall, as the data in Table Two reveal, the prioritization
of issues in post conﬂict countries varies signiﬁcantly between
regions (p = <0.001). 14 Key diﬀerences are apparent in the
issue-salience of topics. For example, state discourse in Afri-
can countries places signiﬁcantly more emphasis on education
(26.3%) and skills and training (7.3%), compared to Asia
(10.9% and 3.0%, respectively) and Europe (4.8% and 2.8%,
respectively) where provision is, generally, more extensive.
Whereas greater attention is placed on ‘‘participation” in
European states (21.4%), compared to Africa and Asia
(3.8% and 9.2%, respectively). The same is true of ‘‘data”
(i.e., the availability of gender equality indicators) (4.4% com-
pared to 0.5 and 2.8). While African and Asian states place
signiﬁcantly more emphasis on rights (13.7 and 17.3—com-
pared to 8.1%) (see Table 2).
Notwithstanding the existence of statistically-signiﬁcant dif-
ferences between issue-areas, the proﬁle of issue salience for
post conﬂict and non-conﬂict states is broadly similar. As
noted, principal diﬀerences relate to the key frames ‘‘rights”,
‘‘equality”, and GBV. The explanation for this lies in the rub-
ric of the UN reporting requirements. It is problematic and
may help to explain past under-recognition of the speciﬁc chal-
lenges of mainstreaming in war aﬀected states. The reason is
the prescriptive nature of the reports (that are structured
around a series of questions). This exaggerates the degree of
concordance; thereby masking the speciﬁc issues that apply
to war aﬀected states. To address this and gain fuller cog-
nizance of the particular demands of mainstreaming in post
conﬂict countries the following section of this study analyses
the discourse in civil society organisations’ reports to the
UN. They provide a rich account of the demands and chal-
lenges of mainstreaming in war-aﬀected states. In theoretical
terms, in contrast to the state texts, CSO reports draw on ‘‘si-
tuated knowledge” (Stoetzler & Yuval-Davis, 2002)—or ﬁrst-
hand accounts from civil society organizations located in post-
conﬂict communities. They aﬃrm that in war-aﬀected states
participative mainstreaming has speciﬁc data, transitional jus-
tice, and governance requirements as policy actors press for
heightened attention to issues such as the eﬀects on women
of war-induced poverty and human rights violations—as well
as the need to promote women’s empowerment in state recon-
struction and peace-building.
(b) Civil society organisations’ discourse
Two key aspects standout in the following analysis. First,
the distinctive needs and challenges of mainstreaming in
post-conﬂict contexts. Second, and crucially from the perspec-
tive of social theory on ‘‘frame alignment” (see below), there
are key contrasts in issue-salience (or ranking of issue-areas
of concern) when state and civil society organizations are com-
pared (Table 3). This is signiﬁcant in a number of important
respects. It underlines the distinctive requirements and issues
attached to mainstreaming in war-aﬀected societies. It also
conﬁrms a global ‘‘one-size-ﬁts-all” approach to PDM that
spans post- and non-conﬂict states is inappropriate. Thus it
points to the need for adaptive practice in post-conﬂict envi-
ronments. Furthermore, the contrasting issue-salience or pri-
oritization that CSOs attach to frames compared to
governments is evidence of a ‘‘governance disjuncture”
(p = <0.001). 15 It may be seen as symptomatic of a failure
to fully embed participative practices so that in-depth idea-
tional exchange and dialog between CSOs and state elites is
weak or absent. It is exacerbated by war and the way it has
Table 3. Ranking of lead frames in post-conﬂict State and CSO discourse
State CSO Frame
6 1 Participation/equal representation of women in decision making
1 2 Rights
3 3 Gender-based violence
4 4 Education
5 5 Economic inequality/poverty
- 6 Widows
2 7 Generic—gender equality
8 8 Training needs
– 9 Displacement/refugees
7 – Data
Table 2. Regional diﬀerences in issue-salience of policy frames in State Beijing +20 reports (N = 2,498)
Africa Asia Europe
Rights 13.7 17.3 8.1
Generic—equality 6.2 25.5 30.9
GBV 18.4 13.5 18.4
Education 26.3 10.9 4.8
Economic inequality/poverty 15.1 8.1 3.4
Participation 3.8 9.2 21.4
Data 0.5 2.8 4.4
Empowerment 7.5 5.9 2.4
Changing attitudes/discriminatory norms 1.2 3.9 3.4
Training/skills 7.3 3.0 2.8
286 WORLD DEVELOPMENTweakened civil society networking and mobilization—and
undermined CSOs’ general ability to engage with, and make
its ‘‘voice” heard by state elites in fulﬁllment of the BDPfA.
While post conﬂict contexts may present civil society organi-
zations with more room to mobilize freely and allow forms of
mobilization to become more national (not just local, as dur-
ing conﬂict), a burgeoning literature describes the manifold
arresting eﬀects that conﬂict may have on CSOs’ participation.
For example, as Brinkerhoﬀ (2010, p. 69) observes:
some fragile states, especially those in the deteriorating and post-conﬂict
categories, mobilize public opinion and put a media spotlight on interven-
tion efforts. These factors often exacerbate organizational wrangles and
uncoordinated cross-purposes among donors and their partners on the
ground as they respond to their constituencies, and pursue their mandates
and individual interests. Donors do not act as a uniﬁed decision-maker; turf
battles, and bureaucratic inﬁghting result.
In a similar vein, Anand (2005, p. 27) notes a further range
of issues including how: ‘‘conﬂict may exacerbate ethnic riv-
alry or weaken trust, and diminish possibilities for collective
action”, with further challenges arising from ‘‘diminished
human resource capacity of institutions in the post-conﬂict
phase due to displacement and migration”. Moreover,
Evans-Kent and Bleiker (2003, p. 103) paint a picture of the
particular challenges of post-conﬂict settings for participation:
‘‘NGOs remain severely limited by ad hoc and project-speciﬁc
funding sources, as well as by the overall policy environment
in which they operate. Unless these underlying issues are
addressed, NGOs will ultimately become little more than
extensions of prevalent multilateral and state-based approaches
to post-conﬂict reconstruction”. In addition, Wessells (2007,
p. 264, chap. 15) also alludes to the psycho-social damage
of conﬂict on civil society. This means ‘‘mobilization
approaches [to boost NGO participation] face numerous
practical and conceptual obstacles. In some situations, organi-
zational cultures provide signiﬁcant challenges. . . the provision
of direct services can become a surrogate for consultation,partnership, and empowerment. It can also become a
mind-set and part of organizational culture that is diﬃcult
to change”. Moreover, Kandiyoti (2006, chap. 15) observes
how years of gender oppression during conﬂict undermines
women’s social capital and negatively impacts on both skills
and propensity to engage in policy and politics, a pathology
compounded by the bureaucratization of aid programmes in
the aftermath of war. This resonates with the work of
Fitzduﬀ and Church (2004, p. 3, chap. 1) who note that ‘‘many
NGOs, perhaps the majority, do not feel as yet they have the
experience, skills, conﬁdence, time or resources to step away
from their daily activities and engage in the policy arena.
For some this has led to a sense of powerlessness where oﬃcial
actors and the policy process are concerned which inhibits
their ability to strategize and engage eﬀectively”. Lastly,
Antlo¨v, Brinkerhoﬀ and Rapp’s (2010, p. 417) account points
to diﬃculties stemming from ‘‘overreliance on confrontational
advocacy strategies, shallow organizational capacity, inability
to cooperate to leverage impact, limited outreach to indige-
nous constituencies and sustainability problems”.
In the present study the foregoing challenges facing civil
society organizations manifest themselves in a dissonance;
state and civil society are shown to be pursuing diﬀerent
actions and priorities. Taken together, they point to the dis-
tinctiveness of the post-conﬂict environment for the applica-
tion of mainstreaming. Importantly, they underline that
mainstreaming needs to be adapted to the needs of post-
conﬂict states through state-civil society dialog in order that
it is supported and ‘‘owned” by citizens as well as elites.
The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action is explicit
on the foregoing point. As noted, Article 20 highlights the
need for civil society engagement in the implementation of
gender mainstreaming. A strong indication that current prac-
tice falls short of this is the fact that the lead frame in the civil
society organisations’ discourse is increasing women’s partici-
pation in decision-making. It accounted for almost a third of
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Figure 2. Civil society organisations’ and state framing on the implementation of the BDPfA in post-conﬂict countries (N = 15,428).
CIVIL SOCIETY AND GENDER MAINSTREAMING 287all quasi-sentences (31.1%), whereas it was a lowly sixth-
ranked in the state discourse (Figure 2). The current ﬁndings
show civil society organizations repeatedly calling on govern-
ing elites to increase opportunities for women to participate in
matters like peace-building and reconstruction. As noted, the
CSO discourse also underlines how the legacy of war disrupts
and diminishes civil society organizations’ networks and
capacity to engage in policy work. Examples of this
include: ‘‘Firstly, threats and attacks on the right to life by
the various combatants force women to move, for the most
part, away from the rural areas, where they are conducting
productive projects that empower other women and
strengthen society, which causes a disruption of organizational
processes” 16; and
Along with the deepening violence women experience during war, the long-
term effects of conﬂict and militarization create a culture of violence that
renders women especially vulnerable after war, because institutions of gov-
ernance and law are weakened and social fragmentation is pro-
nounced. . .We reafﬁrm the important role of women in the prevention
and resolution of conﬂicts and in peace-building, and to stress the impor-
tance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for
the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to in-
crease their role in decision-making with regard to conﬂict prevention
and resolution'. 17
This is a troubling ﬁnding because, as a burgeoning litera-
ture attests, post-conﬂict contexts may present propitious
political opportunity structures for feminist activism
(Handrahan, 2004; Kandiyoti, 2006, chap. 15; Smet, 2009).
As noted, the ‘‘policy window” (Kingdon, 1995) following
the cessation of conﬂict creates opportunities to challenge pre-
vailing attitudes, establish new norms, propose new rules,
select and empower new leaders, and embed gender equality
in new institutions (Goetz & Hassim, 2003). In the parlance
of (neo-)institutionalist theory (Collier & Collier, 1991;
Ertman, 1997) post-conﬂict societies present a ‘‘critical
juncture” and avail opportunities to disrupt the ‘‘pathdependency” (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002, p. 6) of male-oriented
norms and practices that have hitherto characterized contem-
porary culture.
The analysis also reveals that framing in relation to partici-
pation frequently invokes the UN policy framework as a rai-
son d’etre for revised practice by government—emphasizing
the need to embed women’s participation in peace treaties
and the policies of reconstruction. For example, ‘‘We call on
the United Nations and its Member States to implement and
expand the provisions of Security Council resolution 1325
(2000), by . . . integrating the role of women into decision-
making in post-conﬂict reconstruction and in peace-
making” 18; ‘‘women continue to be left out of formal peace
processes. The continued marginalization of women in formal
peace processes is a huge impediment to sustainable develop-
ment, democracy, and lasting peace” 19; and ‘‘main goal is
to guarantee that gender equality and women full participa-
tion in post-conﬂict society is eﬀectively included as one of
the goals of peace agreements and women full participation
in post-conﬂict society”. 20 The prominence of the ‘‘participa-
tion” frame is both a reﬂection of an apparent strong demand
on the part of CSOs to engage and an indication that women
remain under-represented and marginalized in the process of
reconstruction. The signal message emerging from the data
is that implementation of the PDM in post-conﬂict states
requires speciﬁc adaptive measures to overcome this; it is an
issue that is returned to in the penultimate section of the
paper.
The second-ranked frame was ‘‘justice/rights” (10.7%). As
in the case of the state discourse, this underlines the interplay,
(often overlooked in the mainstreaming literature), between
‘‘transitional justice”, gender justice and post-conﬂict recon-
struction (cf. Mckay, 2000; Tomlinson, 2011). However, in
contrast to the earlier state discourse, CSOs placed particular
emphasis on the enforcement of rights. The distinction here is
that government discourse can be characterized by an over-
288 WORLD DEVELOPMENTriding concern with public administration whereas CSOs’
emphasis is on citizen protection and empowerment. Examples
of the civil society discourse include: ‘‘to defend fundamental
human rights, including freedom of thought, expression and
assembly or organization. . .promotes the growth and develop-
ment of free and vigorous civil societies”, 21 and ‘‘Women’s
rights as human rights are indeed fundamental to societal
growth and well-being”. 22 True to the normative vision of
mainstreaming the discourse demands that human rights be
embedded in all aspects of governance and policy. For exam-
ple, we ‘‘call on all donor countries to place women’s human
rights at the core of funding policies for reconstruction and
development by ensuring that women avail of funds
directly” 23; and ‘‘We urge [government] to endorse the idea
of integrating peace/human rights education into all systems
of education as a positive means of preventing violent con-
ﬂict”. 24
A further prominent concern in the CSO discourse related to
damaged and dysfunctional justice systems in post-conﬂict
states. In particular, attention centered on the diminished
capacity to uphold laws promoting gender equality. For exam-
ple, ‘‘discrimination in the justice system may result in a num-
ber of ways, including from laws that do not at ﬁrst glance
appear to be discriminatory, or from a lack of enforcement
of laws”. 25 Allied to the foregoing, the data also show CSOs
calling for incorporation of UN obligations into domestic law.
For example, ‘‘Since international mandates are often not
implemented, even within signatory countries, national laws
that promote women’s rights need to be adopted and
enforced”. 26
Within the frame a reoccurring trope was gender and
access to justice. A burgeoning literature attests to wide-
spread and deep-set problems in ensuring that prevailing
legal structures and processes are accessible and promoted
gender equality (cf. Askin, 2002; Manjoo & McRaith, 2011;
Meertens & Zambrano, 2010). Examples of the present
discourse include: ‘‘discrimination in the justice system may
result in a number of ways, including. . . from a failure to
institute special measures to redress the historically unequal
opportunities provided to men and women or from women’s
lack of access to justice. . . they symbolize the clear disrespect
of Governments for the fundamental right of women to
equality” 27; and there is a continuing need ‘‘to remove the
obstacles to access to justice by women and girl survivors
of violence. . . [and] to empower organizations ﬁghting
violence against women and girls so they can intervene as
civil plaintiﬀs by 2015”. 28
Raising awareness of gender rights is a further key theme
under this frame. For example: ‘‘Women and girls should
have access to justice. While all people are entitled to justice,
women and girls are often unaware of their rights and signif-
icant barriers are put in their way in seeking to exercise those
rights. Cultural as well as institutional barriers must be
traversed so that women’s human rights are not trampled
upon. Gender-friendly police and courts are important”. 29
The discourse also underlines the need for the descriptive
representation of women in the institutions of justice, in
other words, as a burgeoning literature attests (cf. Razavi,
1997) gender balance in oﬃcial positions—such as the parlia-
ment and the judiciary. For example, ‘‘it is only through the
participation of women in peace-making, and protection in
their role as vital witnesses in post-conﬂict war crimes
tribunals, that other women will feel safe enough to confront
their oppressors”. 30 Moreover, analysis of the CSO
discourse underlines the need to secure gender equality inleadership roles in civil society organizations. For example,
‘‘to place women’s human rights at the core of funding
policies for reconstruction and development by ensuring that
women. . .participate and take leadership in reconstructing
community life and to participate in decision-making at
local, regional and national levels”. 31
Gender-based violence was the third-ranked frame (9.8%).
As Chrispus Okello and Hovil (2007, p. 433) note, over recent
years ‘‘gender-related crimes have been pervasive [yet] the nas-
cent ﬁeld of transitional justice is only just beginning to grap-
ple with these issues or design appropriate measures of
redress”. This is reﬂected in the CSO discourse. For example,
we ‘‘urge national governments and the international commu-
nity to ensure full implementation of international humanitar-
ian and human rights law that protects the rights of women
and children during and after conﬂicts [and] Address the roots
of conﬂicts such as ‘gender-related’ violations including
rape”. 32 Greater attention to the health implications of
GBV was a further prominent trope. For example, ‘‘In
Rwanda, widows who were victims of rape during the geno-
cide, continue, nearly a decade later, to face abuse and stigma,
and without the most rudimentary health care for lack of
funds”. 33
The fourth-ranked frame was education (9.2% of quasi-
sentences). Two main tropes characterized this frame. Educa-
tion as a means of empowerment—and embedding peace,
respect, and tolerance in the school curriculum. In the former
case Sorensen (1998, p. 25) observes, ‘‘eﬀorts to create demo-
cratic institutions and recognize basic human rights are man-
ifold in most post-conﬂict countries. From a gender
perspective, these eﬀorts are often welcomed as a step to creat-
ing greater gender equality and women have been active in try-
ing to protect this new space by organizing civic education”.
This is reﬂected in the CSO discourse. For example,
‘‘Strengthening women’s capacities to act through systems
and in public forums can be accomplished by well-developed
‘popular education’ at the community level as well as through
academic higher education, which, though valuable and neces-
sary, is not available to many women”. 34 The discourse on
community-based initiatives is complemented by that on state
schooling. For example, ‘‘there is a need for curriculum reform
and teacher training for higher quality schools to provide a
more robust and relevant educational opportunities for
girls”. 35
Fifth-ranked, ‘‘economic equality/poverty” was a frame
that accounted for 8.6% of quasi-sentences in the CSO
discourse. For example, ‘‘gender equality is absolutely
essential both for the progressive realization of women’s
rights and for any successful development strategy. Women
continue to bear the brunt of poverty. It is estimated that
70% of the poor are women, and their lack of power
and assets is a major obstacle to poverty eradication”. 36
Notably, the discourse places particular attention on the
negative social consequences of poverty. For example,
‘‘poverty is taking new shapes, such as human traﬃcking,
and is increasing. . . those who fall prey to human traﬃckers
are those in extreme poverty. . .Without addressing the
root cause of poverty, its consequences, such as human
traﬃcking, child marriage, prostitution, and other social
evils, cannot be prevented”. 37
Underlining the distinctiveness of the post-conﬂict environ-
ment for mainstreaming practices, meeting the policy needs of
war widows was the next ranked frame (5.9%). Diverse tropes
made up the frame including attention to participation and
human rights.
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ed”. . . In the reconstruction process these women are so often neglected,
their voices are not heard. They have no legal rights. Neither their immedi-
ate nor their long-term needs are adequately addressed. These abandoned
women should be crucial players in the reconstruction process. . .They
are the very backbone of society and we should empower them. 38
In addition, attention centered on greater attention to ‘‘the
link between the poverty of children and the lack of widows’
human rights” 39; as well as the need for more accurate data
to underpin policy: ‘‘there is a lack of reliable data on, among
others, numbers, ages, needs, roles, lifestyles, experiences of
violence, coping strategies, support systems and aspirations
of widows”. 40 Moreover, CSOs called for more measures to
prevent the exploitation and end the vulnerability of widows.
For example, ‘‘in Afghanistan and Iraq young widows and
the daughters of widows have been sold into forced marriages,
exploited labor, prostitution, and traﬃcking. Widows, because
they have no longer the protection of a male partner, are
exposed to rape and other violence. Traditional customs
may deny them rights of inheritance or land ownership so that
there is no possible escape from their poverty”. 41
It is also notable that CSOs generally eschew speciﬁc refer-
ence to ‘‘mainstreaming”. The latter accounted for under 1%
of quasi-sentences overall. This is striking and suggests that
CSOs generally lack both knowledge and awareness of the
concept. Such a ‘‘disconnect” is deeply problematic for, as
Walby (2005, p. 332) explains, ‘‘the level of sophistication of
the gender equality awareness within the political environment
aﬀects whether state functionaries can eﬀectively implement
gender mainstreaming”. Thus the present ﬁndings resonate
with earlier work on African states by Wendoh and Wallace
(2005, p. 75). This concluded that: ‘‘gender mainstreaming is
largely an external concept. It has been adopted by govern-
ments and by some local NGOs, usually those headed by
women and urban based. Gender mainstreaming is often per-
ceived by other NGOs to be for the beneﬁt of donors, rather
than the beneﬁt of communities’.
Furthermore, the ﬁndings reveal how gender mainstreaming
in post-conﬂict contexts requires attention to women’s train-
ing and skills. It is an issue outlined by Das (2014, p. 206)
who notes, ‘‘understanding of the gap between women’s moti-
vation to participate and their ability or agency to do
so. . .highlights how bridging this gap could be pivotal in
strengthening women’s role in. . . governance”. Examples of
the discourse include, ‘‘Enabling Environment. . .Needed are
more mentoring and training programs so that women will
be ready to step into such roles” 42; ‘‘the priorities in justice
for these widows are for security, protection from violence,
enjoyment of the right to education and training for paid
work” 43; and ‘‘the gender sensitizing training of peacekeeping
forces has not progressed suﬃciently nor has there been ade-
quate publication of monitoring or evaluation”. 44
A further key aspect of the CSO discourse was the way that
post-conﬂict states present the need for adaptive implementa-
tion of the PDM in order to address gendered patterns of care.
Examples include: ‘‘Many young women are carers of adults
disabled by conﬂict. They themselves experience long-term
physical and psychological eﬀects of conﬂict. Furthermore
there has been little focus on how they can be more eﬀectively
involved in peace building processes”; and ‘‘Many young
women are carers of adults disabled by conﬂict. They them-
selves experience long-term physical and psychological eﬀects
of conﬂict. Furthermore there has been little focus on how
they can be more eﬀectively involved in peace-building pro-
cesses. Young women are crucial stakeholders in post conﬂict
reconstruction yet in many countries there has been little or noattempt to engage girls in constructing future peaceful soci-
eties, and in doing so to tackle the domination of political are-
nas by men”. 45
Lastly, ‘‘gender budgeting” refers to a gender-based assess-
ment of budgets, incorporating a gender perspective at all
levels of the budgetary process and restructuring revenues
and expenditures in order to promote gender equality”
(Quinn, 2009). It is a further frame in the discourse where
CSOs emphasize the need for adaptive practice in post-
conﬂict contexts. Examples of the discourse include: ‘‘the par-
ticipation of women in creating gender-responsive budgets is
critical to enhancing this process [of promoting gender equal-
ity]. However, the lack of adequate resources has been one fac-
tor at the national level that has hindered progress toward the
fulﬁllment of commitments made by governments on ﬁnancing
for gender equality and the empowerment of women”. 465. A TRANSFORMATIVE MODEL OF PARTICIPATIVE
MAINSTREAMING IN POST-CONFLICT STATES
The foregoing empirical analysis is the basis for theory-
building. Speciﬁcally, based on government and civil society
discourse, the data identify the ways in which the implementa-
tion of PDM needs to be adapted in war-aﬀected countries.
The resulting Transformative Model of Participative Main-
streaming proposed here is based on Vayrynen’s (1991) work
on conﬂict theory and transformation (Figure 3). However,
in contrast to the original, it is not directly concerned with
conﬂict, but rather its aftermath—and gender mainstreaming
in war-aﬀected states across diverse aspects including peace-
building, reconstruction and democratization. As Figure 3
reveals, four Transformational Domains apply to the applica-
tion of PDM: actor (internal changes in civil and civic society);
issue (altering the agenda of gender relations); rule (changes in
the norms or rules governing gender relations); and structural
(revising the structure of gender relations and power distribu-
tion in the post-conﬂict society).
Based upon the foregoing empirical analysis, each of the
domains is populated by ‘‘Post-conﬂict issues/Actions”. They
represent the issues emerging from the discourse analysis
needing speciﬁc attention in post-conﬂict states. In other
words, in contrast to practice elsewhere, they are areas
where the implementation of participative mainstreaming
needs to be adapted to the speciﬁties of the war-aﬀected states.
The following examples provide illustration using the CSO
discourse:
 Actor Transformations (meaning: internal changes in civil
and civic society)—Training for gender-equality in labor-
market, public-life etc. denied through conﬂict. For example
a SudaneseCSOcalls for action to: ‘‘developwomen’s capac-
ities and impart skills to women with the aim of improving
their economic situation. . . Improve women’s leadership
abilities on the basis of project implementation and provide
a database for the purpose of forecasting women’s needs in
the diﬀerent core areas of development”. 47
 Issue Transformations (meaning: altering the agenda of
gender relations)—Embed peace/tolerance and gender equal-
ity in school curriculum. For example: ‘‘Recommendations
for Governments, international actors, and civil society
organizations. There are several barriers that prevent girls
from going to school. . .There is a need for curriculum
reform and teacher training for higher quality schools to
provide a more robust and relevant educational opportuni-
ties for girls”. 48
Transformaon 
Domain 
Post-conﬂict issues/ Acons
Actor 
transformaons  – 
internal changes in 
civil and civic society; 
Redress - pursuing rights violaons/ GBV that occurred during conﬂict 
Increase women’s access to educaon – disrupted/ denied through conﬂict 
Promote women’s health and well-being negavely impacted by war 
Training – for gender-equality in labour-market, public-life etc. denied through conﬂict 
Improve women’s access to jusce to address rights violaons during war 
Measure to develop women’s social capital/ associave life to promote parcipave 
democracy/ policy engagement – and seize post-conﬂict polical opportunity 
structures  
Secure gender equality in leadership roles in civil society organisaons 
Issue transformaons
– altering the agenda 
of gender relaons; 
Data-gathering – address general absence of social data-gathering during war/ 
retrospecve data-gathering during peaceme to inform understanding of gendered 
impact of conﬂict 
Policy intervenon to meet welfare needs of war widows 
Embed peace/ tolerance and gender equality in school curriculum 
Address gendered impact of war-induced poverty 
Promote women’s rights as fundamental to state reconstrucon/ societal growth 
Address the gendered impact of war-related people-displacement/ refugees 
Implement policies designed to address interseconal issues linked to conﬂict (e.g. 
gender, poverty and age; gender and ethnicity/ faith) 
Social care policies need to be adapted to meet and address the speciﬁc issues related 
to war survivors/ veteran and their carers 
Rule transformaons
– changes in the 
norms or rules 
governing gender 
relaons; 
Embed gender rights in new post-conﬂict governance 
Enshrine women’s rights/ gender equality in revised/ post-conﬂict constuonal 
frameworks 
Promong cultural / atudinal change in peaceme – end associaon between 
androcencism and bellicosity  
Promote societal awareness of women’s rights/ gender equality in context of rights 
violaons during war 
Adopon of mainstreaming tools/ techniques as fundamental tenet of government 
policy-making to address legacy of war 
Structural / 
instuonal 
transformaons  – 
changing the 
structure of gender 
relaons and power 
distribuon in the 
post-conﬂict society. 
Transional jusce - rebuilding of state instuons to uphold women’s rights (e.g. 
equality and human rights commissions) 
Women’s parcipaon in post-conﬂict decision-making/ women’s role in peace-
building and reconstrucon 
Address discriminaon in the jusce system – repeal laws that are discriminatory/ 
address under-enforcement of equality and HR laws 
Ensure gender-equal (re-)distribuon of wealth (gender budgeng) as part of move 
away from a war economy 
Rebuild state-civil society nexus set-back/ weakened by episodes of conﬂict 
Figure 3. A Transformative Model of Participative Mainstreaming in Post-conﬂict States.
290 WORLD DEVELOPMENT Rule Transformations (meaning: changes in the norms or
rules governing gender relations)—Enshrine women’s
rights/gender equality in revised/post-conﬂict constitutional
frameworks. For example: ‘‘voices must be heard. . .They
must be involved in decision-making at every level, from
the national to the village. Reforms in the law and new con-
stitutions must reﬂect the rights they have under interna-
tional conventions, in keeping with the Beijing Platform
for Action”. 49
 Structural/Institutional Transformations (meaning:
changing the structure of gender relations and power distri-
bution in the post-conﬂict society)—Women’s participation
in post-conﬂict decision-making/ women’s role in peace-
building and reconstruction. For example: ‘‘Participate in
peacebuilding. . .women continue to suﬀer from marginal-
ization [. . .we advocate action] to facilitate the direct
engagement of women in decision-making and in public
life. . .building a better means of participation for women
during peace processes”. 50
The model underlines the discursive underpinnings of political
and policy intervention to promote gender equality. In doingthis it draws on Snow and Benford’s (1988) seminal work on
social movements and the notion of ‘‘frame-alignment”. As
noted, this is an important element in social mobilization.
Speciﬁcally, it identiﬁes the issue areas where the frames of
key policy actors—such as government and civil society—need
to be aligned (‘‘frame resonance”). When this occurs actors ‘
‘mobilise”—in other words, they successfully advance claims
on government, in turn leading to revised policy and practice
(Snow et al., 1986). Such frame alignment may occur in any
and each of the four domains of the Model. The underlying
premise of the model is that eﬀective mainstreaming is contin-
gent on alignment between CSOs’ and governing elites’ fram-
ing of gender mainstreaming in relation to the Post-conﬂict
issues/Actions. There needs to be cooperation, collaboration,
and dialog between government and civil society founded on
state recognition and appropriate response to CSO claims
across the four domains—such that both sides are following
shared cognitive maps for action. This is necessary for when
CSOs’ and governing elites’ framing of mainstreaming diﬀers
progress is likely to be diminished—or even prevented—
though a range of factors. The latter include: conscious or
unconscious resistance, the over-extension of available
CIVIL SOCIETY AND GENDER MAINSTREAMING 291resources (for they are not targeted in a strategic manner), and
uncoordinated (and possibly conﬂicting) actions as govern-
ment and CSOs pursue contrasting aims and priorities.6. CONCLUSION
This study makes an original contribution to contemporary
understanding of the promotion of gender equality. When
post-conﬂict states are compared to non-conﬂict states, the
analysis shows that distinctive policy framing and issue sal-
ience applies to war-aﬀected counties. This is important to pol-
icy and practice because it underlines that it is inappropriate to
apply a universal approach to implementing the Participative
Democratic Model of gender mainstreaming across all 180+
states that are signatories to the United Nations Beijing Dec-
laration and Platform for Action.
Instead, as the foregoing critical analysis of government and
civil society discourse reveals, post-conﬂict societies present
speciﬁc issues and challenges. These extend across four
domains: actor transformations (internal changes in civil and
civic society), issue transformations (altering the agenda of
gender relations), rule transformations (changes in the norms
or rules governing gender relations) and structural/institu-
tional transformations (changing the structure of gender rela-
tions and power distribution in the post-conﬂict society). They
include data, transitional justice and governance requirements
that are speciﬁc to post-conﬂict societies as policy actors press
for heightened attention to issues such as the eﬀects on women
of war-induced poverty and human rights violations—as well
as the need to promote women’s empowerment in state recon-
struction and peace-building.
The contrasting issue-salience and prioritization that CSOs
attach to frames compared to governments identiﬁed in this
study can be seen as evidence of a ‘‘governance disjuncture”.
A primary reason is the failure to fully embed participative
practices so that in-depth ideational exchange and dialog
can take place between CSOs and state elites. The present
analysis shows governments have failed to give suﬃcientattention to the issue-areas of concern emphasized by CSOs.
This ‘‘disconnect” is exacerbated by war and the way it has
weakened civil society networking and mobilization—and
thus undermined CSOs’ general ability to engage with, and
make its ‘‘voice” heard by state elites in fulﬁllment of the
BDPfA.
The way that the aftermath of war may accentuate a dis-
juncture between the discourse of civil society organizations
and governing policy elites (frame misalignment—or disso-
nance) is captured by the Model of Transformative Main-
streaming outlined in the foregoing discussion. It shows how
such a situation may hamper progress toward gender equality
because a necessary pre-condition for eﬀective mainstreaming
is absent; namely alignment in the policy framing of govern-
ment and civil society organizations—such that both parties
have shared understandings, priorities, and ‘‘cognitive maps”
for action. The current study also suggests a number of ave-
nues for future research including: analysis of the changing
issue-salience of policy frames over time following the cessa-
tion of war; study of how attempts to implement the participa-
tive democratic model of mainstreaming are shaped by past-
governing traditions in the polity (including electoral politics,
dominant political ideologies, voting systems, and the power
of the military); and examination of the inter-connections
between political communication, citizen education and the
promotion of mainstreaming.
In summary, the present analysis underlines that where there
is dissonance between state and civil society policy framing
eﬀective implementation of gender mainstreaming may falter.
This is because of factors like conscious or unconscious resis-
tance to reform, failure to target ﬁnite resources in a strategic
manner, and uncoordinated (and possibly conﬂicting)
actions—as government and CSOs pursue contrasting policy
aims and priorities. To ward against such pathologies, the cur-
rent study emphasizes the need for adaptive practice utilizing
the Transformative Model of Participative Mainstreaming in
order that the implementation of mainstreaming is tailored to
the speciﬁcities of war-aﬀected states and founded on eﬀective
participation and co-working between state and civil society.NOTES1. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf/BDPfA%20E.pdf.2. See for example, http://www.pcr.uu.se and http://www.systemicpeace.
org/warlist/warlist.htm [accessed 25.01.2015].3. As part of the follow-up to the Fourth UN World Conference on
Women and the 23rd special session of the General Assembly.4. See Uppsala Conﬂict Data Program (2010) http://www.pcr.uu.se/
research/UCDP/data_and_publications/deﬁnition_of_armed_conﬂict.htm
[accessed 25.01.2015].
5. See for example, http://www.pcr.uu.se and http://www.systemicpeace.
org/warlist/warlist.htm [accessed 25.01.2015].
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8. v2 = 795.176, df = 9.9. v2 = 113.006, df = 1.
10. v2 = 239.67, df = 1.
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29. Zonta International; E/CN.6/2014/NGO/170.
30. National Alliance of Women’s Organizations; E/CN.6/2004/
NGO/30.
31. European Women’s Lobby; E/CN.6/2004/NGO/12.
32. World Association of Girl Guides and Girl Scouts; E/CN.6/2008/
NGO/5.
33. Empowering Widows in Development; E/CN.6/2004/NGO/7.
34. Grail; E/CN.6/2004/NGO/26.35. Femmes Afrique Solidarite´, International Association of Lawyers
Against Nuclear Arms and Women’s International League for Peace and
Freedom; E/CN.6/2011/NGO/49.
36. Christian Aid, E/CN.6/2014/NGO/25.
37. Society of Catholic Medical Missionaries, E/CN.6/2014/NGO/126.
38. Empowering Widows in Development; E/CN.6/2005/NGO/7.
39. Widows Rights International; E/CN.6/2006/NGO/7.
40. Guild of Service, E/CN.6/2014/NGO/43.
41. Empowering Widows in Development, E/CN.6/2005/NGO/7.
42. World Veterans Federation; E/CN.6/2006/NGO/21.
43. Empowering Widows in Development; E/CN.6/2004/NGO/7.
44. Women’s National Commission; E/CN.6/2004/NGO/28.
45. Northern Ireland Women’s European Platform; E/CN.6/2007/
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46. International Council of Women, International Federation of
Business and Professional Women, International Federation of University
Women, Soroptimist International and Zonta International;
E/CN.6/2008/NGO/1.
47. Sudanese Women General Union, E/CN.6/2011/NGO/31.
48. Femmes Afrique Solidarite´ et al. E/CN.6/2011/NGO/49.
49. Empowering Widows in Development E/CN.6/2004/NGO/7.
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